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UNCOUPLING HABEAS CORPUS AND DUE 
PROCESS 
Jonathan G. D’Errico* 
 
Isn’t there a pretty good argument that a suspension of the writ . . . is just 
about the most stupendously significant act that the Congress of the United 
States can take? 
—Justice Souter1 
INTRODUCTION 
The writ of habeas corpus, befittingly coined the Great Writ,2 stands as 
one of the Constitution’s preeminent safeguards of individual liberty.  At its 
core, the Great Writ enables a prisoner to challenge the legality of his or her 
detention before a neutral decision-maker.3  In turn, habeas corpus serves as 
a critical means for the judiciary to examine the legality of Executive 
detention, thereby enabling “the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in 
maintaining this delicate balance of governance.”4 
However, the Great Writ is not a guaranteed constant.  In limited 
circumstances, Congress can undertake the “stupendously significant”5 act 
 
*  J.D., 2019, Fordham University School of Law; B.M., 2013, New York University.  I am 
very grateful for the scholarly contributions put forth by Professor Trevor W. Morrison and 
Professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr., which greatly informed this work.  Great thanks are due the 
editors and members of Volume 88 of the Fordham Law Review, with special gratitude to the 
Fordham Law Review Online editors, Nora Stewart and Lena Bruce, for making this Article a 
reality. 
 
 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 57–58, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2007) 
(No. 05-184). 
 2. This moniker seemingly stems from William Blackstone’s reference to habeas corpus 
as “the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement.” WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *131.  Blackstone viewed the writ as a critical element in 
securing “the glory of the English law.” Id. at *133.  Both his nickname and reverence for the 
writ have heartily persisted through modern iterations of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Holland 
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). 
 3. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301–03 (2001). 
 4. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536; see also id. at 301 (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas 
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that 
context that its protections have been strongest.”); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380 n. 13 
(1977); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result) (“The 
historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve detention by executive authorities without 
judicial trial.”). 
 5. Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2007) (No. 
05-184). 
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of suspending the writ and thereby temporarily prevent prisoners from 
invoking its review-based protection.6  This Article examines whether the 
suspension of habeas corpus discharges the Executive from the legal 
constraints on detention imposed by the Due Process Clause.7  This 
exploration concludes by finding that select elements of the Due Process 
Clause persist even during suspension and thus restrict otherwise forbidden 
Executive action.  Part I overviews the scope of the Great Writ and the effect 
of its suspension.  Part II details two conflicting views of the writ’s 
relationship with the constitutional demands of due process.  Finally, Part III 
asserts that suspension quiets some facets of the Due Process Clause but does 
not entirely extinguish the right to procedural due process. 
I.  THE SILHOUETTE OF THE GREAT WRIT 
Although the Great Writ has persisted across legal systems for hundreds 
of years, hammering out the precise scope of habeas corpus, along with its 
proper place in our constitutional system, presents a surprising amount of 
uncertainty and disagreement.8  Habeas corpus only appears in the 
Constitution by brief implication in the Suspension Clause:  “[t]he Privilege 
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases 
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”9  Although the 
history of the Suspension Clause is somewhat muddled,10 the Supreme Court 
has asserted that, at a minimum, the Suspension Clause encompasses and 
protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789.11  Habeas stands alone 
as the only common law writ referenced in the Constitution.12 
 
 6. See infra notes 21–22. 
 7. Academic discourse has provided two opposing views on this issue.  Perhaps two of 
the most poignant views are delivered, in much fuller form than this Article, by Professor 
Morrison and Professor Shapiro. See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle:  
Suspension as Authorization?, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 411 (2006); David L. Shapiro, Habeas 
Corpus, Suspension, and Detention:  Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59 (2006).  
Further discussion of these viewpoints can be found infra accompanying notes 28-38. 
 8. George Rutherglen, Structural Uncertainty over Habeas Corpus & the Jurisdiction of 
Military Tribunals, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 397, 398 (2002) (“After more than two hundred years, 
we still do not know the scope and dimensions of the protection that [habeas corpus] affords 
against executive detention.”).  To further affirm the cloudy nature of the Great Writ, one need 
look no further than the wildly differing understandings of habeas from Justices O’Connor 
and Scalia in Hamdi. 542 U.S. at 509–39, 554–79.  Indeed, “the history of the writ has always 
been marked by a considerable degree of discretion.” Shapiro, supra note 7, at 66. 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 10. For further reading, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1289-93 
(5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER]. 
 11. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–02 (2001); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662–
64 (1996); see also Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (“Acting under the 
immediate influence of [the Suspension Clause], [Congress] must have felt, with peculiar 
force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege 
should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would 
be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted.  Under the impression of this 
obligation, they give, to all the courts, the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus.”). 
 12. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). 
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However, the Constitution’s language does little to elucidate the actual 
nature of the writ.  At its core, the Great Writ is a safeguard of individual 
liberty.13  Generally, the writ can be characterized as a means to determine 
the lawfulness of a prisoner’s custody:  once properly invoked by a prisoner, 
the custodian is required to produce the prisoner, along with a statement 
describing the circumstances of the prisoner’s detention, before a neutral 
decision-maker.14  If the decision-maker finds that the reason for the 
prisoner’s detainment fails to pass legal muster, the appropriate remedy 
typically is discharge from custody.15  By providing prisoners with a means 
to challenge unlawful custody, the Court has found that the writ “plays a vital 
role in protecting constitutional rights”16—especially in the context of 
Executive detention.17 
As evidenced by the plain text of the Suspension Clause, a prisoner’s right 
to invoke the writ may be barred in times of national crisis or great 
emergency.18  As largely supported by historical practice, the prevailing view 
is that Congress alone holds the power to authorize the suspension of the 
Great Writ.19  There have been three such suspensions since the Civil War, 
the most recent of which was in response to the attacks on Pearl Harbor in 
1941.20  A valid suspension21 requires dismissal of a habeas petition, 
provided the particular prisoner’s custody falls within the scope of the 
suspension.22  Whether suspension also frees the Executive from the 
restraints otherwise imposed by the Due Process Clause is the subject of the 
remainder of this Article. 
II.  DUE PROCESS AND SUSPENSION 
The right to invoke the writ of habeas corpus has long been viewed as a 
critical vehicle to secure the due process rights of those in custody.23  While 
the Due Process Clause is home to numerous constitutional liberties, one of 
the foremost is the right of a detainee to not be deprived of liberty absent 
 
 13. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 106–07, 130–31 (1866); 
Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830). 
 14. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1284. 
 15. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1284–85. 
 16. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000). 
 17. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301. 
 18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 19. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 
144, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (famously rejecting President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of 
habeas during the Civil War); Morrison, supra note 7, at 428–29. 
 20. Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 344-46 
(2006). 
 21. Congress must act affirmatively and explicitly to suspend habeas; the writ cannot be 
suspended by inaction or implication. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 311–12. 
 22. See e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 130–31 (1866) (“The suspension of the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself.  The writ issues as a 
matter of course; and on the return made to it the court decides whether the party applying is 
denied the right of proceeding any further with it.”). 
 23. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *133–38 (detailing the birth of the writ of habeas corpus 
as essential to maintaining the “true [s]tandard of law and liberty”). 
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sufficient procedural due process.24  Typically, there are three elements to 
such process:  judicial review,25 entitlement (in principle) to a judicial 
remedy,26 and fair process.27  By requiring the Executive to provide an 
impartial decision-maker with a valid cause for depriving a prisoner of his or 
her liberty, the Great Writ is largely the most important vehicle for enforcing 
the procedural promises of the Due Process Clause for prisoners under 
Executive custody.  But what, then, of times of national crisis when the writ 
is suspended?  Do these procedural constraints on Executive detention vanish 
along with the prisoner’s right to employ the writ of habeas corpus? 
Two conflicting views have arisen from academic discourse.  The first 
view wholly “equate[s] the right to be free from unlawful detention with the 
role of habeas corpus in guaranteeing that right.”28  Habeas and procedural 
due process are “not just interdependent but inseparable.”29  As such, the 
legislature’s decision to exercise its suspension power and render habeas 
relief unavailable frees the Executive from the due process restraints on 
 
 24. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall . . . 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. 
V (emphasis added).  The procedural protections lying within the Due Process Clause are the 
premier guardians against unlawful detainment. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) 
(“Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from 
the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67, 81 (1972). 
 25. Judicial review is the bedrock of the American legal system. Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws . . . .”); see also United States v. Nourse, 34 U.S. 
8, 28–29 (1835) (“It would excite some surprise if, in a government of laws and of principle, 
furnished with a department whose appropriate duty is to decide questions of right, not only 
between individuals, but between the government and individuals, a ministerial officer might, 
at his discretion, issue this powerful process . . . leaving to that debtor no remedy, no appeal 
to the laws of his country, if he should believe the claim to be unjust. But this anomaly does 
not exist, this imputation cannot be cast on the legislature of the United States.”).  The Court 
has striven to avoid “the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a federal statute 
were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.” Webster v. 
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (quoting Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 
476 U.S. 667, 681 n. 12 (1986)). 
 26. One of Marbury’s original promises was that every right must have a remedy. See 
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163; see, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395–98 (1971); Ward v. Board of Comm’rs, 253 U.S. 17, 24 (1920); 
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 145 (1908).  Although a number of doctrines—such as 
sovereign immunity, official immunity, and the political question doctrine—present 
roadblocks to this mantra, the Court has generally “relied, either implicitly or explicitly, on 
the availability of injunctions or other remedies to identify and enforce the outer bounds of 
lawfulness.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial Review, 
and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 338–39 (1993). 
 27. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (“By requiring the government to 
follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property,’ the Due Process Clause promotes fairness in such decisions.”); Greenholtz v. 
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“[T]he quantum and 
quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to serve the purpose 
of minimizing the risk of error.”) (emphasis added); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
266 (1970).  Great credit is due Professor Richard Fallon for expertly distinguishing the 
aforementioned three facets of procedural due process. See Fallon, supra note 26, at 329–39. 
 28. Shapiro, supra note 7, at 87. 
 29. Id. at 88. 
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detention that would otherwise apply.30  The suspension of habeas wholly 
extinguishes the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause and 
authorizes otherwise unlawful detention.31  Thus, suspension operates as an 
“on/off” switch for “core due process safeguards.”32 
In contrast, the second view understands habeas as deeply bonded with due 
process, but not entirely inseparable.33  Here, the Great Writ predominantly 
exists as a remedy for unlawful detention—a more limited capacity than the 
first view.34  As a remedial measure, habeas review is the means by which 
the first two facets of procedural due process—judicial review and 
entitlement to a judicial remedy—are satisfied.35  However, habeas is not 
found to encompass the underlying right to fair process as “[f]airness is not 
an exclusively judicial virtue, and judicial process is not coextensive with 
fair process.”36  As such, a valid suspension quenches a prisoner’s right to 
judicial review and entitlement to a judicial remedy, but leaves untouched 
the procedural right to fair process.37  Under this view, suspending the writ 
does not act as an absolute “on/off” switch for due process safeguards—
suspension removes a prisoner’s access to judicial scrutiny and redress but 
does not relieve the Executive from providing fair process as required by the 
Due Process Clause.38  In short, fair process is effectively uncoupled from 
the writ of habeas corpus. 
III.  FIDELITY TO FAIR PROCESS 
Fortunately, a variety of guideposts harken toward the most prudent 
understanding of due process and suspension.  Equipped with the 
understanding that the Suspension Clause encompasses, at a minimum, the 
writ as it existed in 1789,39 one readily apparent guidepost is English 
common law:40  as Chief Justice Marshall instructed in 1807, “for the 
meaning of the term habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the 
 
 30. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 88–89. 
 31. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 88–89; see also Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the 
Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533, 1610 (2007). 
 32. Tyler, supra note 20, at 387; Morrison, supra note 31, at 1610. 
 33. See Morrison, supra note 7, at 432 (“Suspending the writ does not authorize detention; 
a detention’s illegality stands apart from whether the courts are in a position to redress it via 
habeas.”). 
 34. See Morrison, supra note 7, at 427–28, 433–34. 
 35. Morrison, supra note 31, at 1610; see also Morrison, supra note 7, at 433–34. 
 36. Morrison, supra note 31, at 1610. 
 37. Morrison, supra note 31, at 1610–11. 
 38. This view supports the notion that constitutional and legal constraints outside the 
realm of procedural due process could further constrain Executive detention authority, 
however, this is beyond the limited purview of this Article.  For further reading, see Randolph 
D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation:  A Perspective from the Office of Legal 
Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1312 (2000) and see also Morrison, supra note 7, at 415, 
436–37. 
 39. See sources cited supra note 11. 
 40. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93–94 (1807). 
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common law.”41  A review of traditional English practice reveals that the 
suspension of habeas corpus simply removed a specific judicial remedy for 
unlawful custody.42  Suspension did not otherwise authorize detention nor 
insulate the Crown from later-imposed liability.43  If such results were 
desired, Parliament would accompany an act of suspension with additional 
“acts of indemnity,” which specifically shielded the Crown from claims 
alleging unlawful detention.44  If suspension alone sanctioned otherwise 
unlawful detention, there would be no need for such acts.  The existence of 
indemnity acts indicates that, under English common law, suspension 
removed a remedy but did not nullify a detainee’s other substantive rights, 
which were capable of redress. 
Critics have pointed out that Parliamentary supremacy—Parliament was 
traditionally empowered “to make or unmake any law whatever”45—
hamstrings the usefulness of analogizing the English experience to 
understand the Great Writ as it exists in the United States, a legal system 
premised upon constitutional supremacy.46  However, such critiques are 
missing the forest for the trees.  It is true that, historically, the English 
Parliament was empowered to affect (and even nullify) individual rights 
absent legal restraint.47  However, here, the focus is not on the power of the 
legislature, but rather on the nature of habeas and its suspension.  Differing 
notions of legislative primacy do not negate the traditional understanding of 
habeas that passed from English common law into the American 
Constitution; the varying authorities of Parliament and Congress stands as a 
related but distinct facet of this issue.48  The English common law 
understanding of habeas—wherein individual safeguards persist even after 
suspension of the writ—remains a critical guidepost for understanding the 
interaction between American habeas and the Due Process Clause. 
But what of the American understanding of suspension?  Early case law 
proves a fickle read.  In the landmark Civil War case Ex parte Milligan,49 
which arose out of a habeas challenge to Milligan’s detention and eventual 
conviction by a military tribunal, the Court found that Milligan was outside 
the scope of a then current suspension, and, as such, Congress could not 
 
 41. Id.  Chief Justice Marshall also noted that, with regard to habeas, “[t]he term is used 
in the constitution, as one which was well understood” and “known to the common law.” Ex 
parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 201–02 (1830). 
 42. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 171 n. 118 
(1980) (“[S]uspension did not legalize arrest and detention.  It merely suspended the benefit 
of a particular remedy in the specified cases.”); see also R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS 
CORPUS 94–95 (2d ed. 1989).  For a more detailed exploration of this point, including 
legislative history and English scholarship, see Morrison, supra note 31, at 1543–51. 
 43. DUKER, supra note 42, at 171 n. 118; SHARPE, supra note 42, at 95. 
 44. See, e.g., Indemnity Act 41 Geo. 3, c. 66 (1801); see also DUKER, supra note 42, at 
171 n. 118; SHARPE, supra note 42, at 95. 
 45. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 (10th 
ed. 1959). 
 46. Shapiro, supra note 7, at 83–84. 
 47. Shapiro, supra note 7, at 83. 
 48. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93–94 (1807). 
 49. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
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authorize his trial by military tribunal.50  In dictum, the issue of whether a 
valid suspension could authorize otherwise unlawful arrest divided the 
majority and a concurrence comprised of four Justices.51  Proponents of both 
the “on/off switch” and “uncoupled” views of suspension have needled out 
implications from Ex parte Milligan in support of their opposing 
arguments.52  However, to draw such weighty conclusions from dicta and 
undertones seems unwise.  The waters remain muddy. 
Contemporary developments provide greater elucidation.  The modern 
Court has repeatedly characterized habeas as “an adaptable remedy” whose 
“precise application and scope change[] depending upon the 
circumstances.”53  Habeas, thusly characterized as a remedial measure, is 
found to vindicate the due process rights to judicial review54 and entitlement 
to a judicial remedy.55  However, there is a seeming dearth of modern 
jurisprudence suggesting that suspension confers any substantive legal 
authority which sanctions otherwise unlawful detention—perhaps to avoid 
direct antagonism to English common law.56  Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld57 advocated for such a “suspension as authorization” 
model; however, he was only joined by one other Justice.58  Together with 
the common law foundations, this congeals nicely—removing the remedy of 
habeas extinguishes certain avenues to redress (judicial review and 
entitlement to a judicial remedy) but does not necessitate ousting the 
remainder of the Due Process Clause.  Modern jurisprudence suggests that 
there is room for the right to fair process to persist during suspension. 
Fortunately, the Court has sketched out its expectations of what actually 
constitutes fair process, further clarifying that it does not depend upon habeas 
for its existence.  Fair process protects against the “unjustified deprivation of 
 
 50. Id. at 6–8, 115–16, 121–22 (1866). 
 51. Id. at 115 (majority), 137 (concurrence). 
 52. See Morrison, supra note 7, at 430–31, 443–45; Shapiro, supra note 7, at 83–85. 
 53. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (emphasis added); see also Schlup v. 
Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995) (finding that habeas “is, at its core, an equitable remedy”); 
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (describing how habeas is not “a static, 
narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose”). 
 54. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (noting that the Due Process Clause 
“informs the procedural contours” of the judicial review prompted by a detainee’s invocation 
of the writ of habeas corpus); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). 
 55. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1284–85; see, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (noting that the remedial function accomplished by the writ is “to secure 
release from illegal custody.”). 
 56. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934) (“To ascertain its [habeas] meaning and 
the appropriate use of the writ in the federal courts, recourse must be had to the common law, 
from which the term was drawn . . . .”) (overruled on other grounds); see Preiser, 411 U.S. at 
485 (“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 
that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 
custody.”).  Although the scope of the habeas remedy greatly expanded in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, its suspension never entered the realm of conferring substantive authority. 
Id. at 485–86 (tracing the expansion of the habeas remedy). 
 57. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 58. See id. at 554, 561, 577–78; Morrison, supra note 7, at 423–24 (coining the phrase 
“suspension as authorization” to describe Justice Scalia’s understanding of the Suspension 
Clause as articulated in Hamdi). 
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life, liberty, or property,”59 regardless of “the merits of a claimant’s 
substantive assertions.”60  The Court has found that three elements generally 
comprise the fair process necessary to avoid an unjustified deprivation.  First, 
there must be a “neutral and detached” decision-maker.61  Additionally, 
“[p]arties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order 
that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.”62  This fair process 
calculus is flexible.  For instance, in Hamdi, the Court concluded that an 
enemy combatant was entitled to notice and a hearing before a neutral 
decision-maker (“an appropriately authorized and properly constituted 
military tribunal”) but that the government need only meet the “some 
evidence” threshold in order to justify detention.63  The three elements of fair 
process can bend to the nature of the exigency and are capable of satisfaction 
outside the judicial process. 
The Court’s implications for fair process during suspension thus rise to the 
surface.  To comply with fair process during suspension, detainees must be 
provided with an explanation for the Executive custody and an opportunity 
to rebut such an explanation before a detached decision-maker.64  The 
Court’s approach in Hamdi suggests that the Executive will need to create its 
own decision rules “flexible enough to accommodate the nature of the 
national emergency at hand.”65 
The plain language of the Constitution seemingly endorses such self-
regulation.  The President is bound by oath to “preserve, protect and 
defend”66 the Constitution and to faithfully carry out the duties of the 
Executive office.67  In addition, the Executive must “take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed.”68  Taken together, the Executive is charged with an 
independent duty of constitutional fidelity.69  As described above, the fair 
 
 59. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). 
 60. Id. at 266. 
 61. Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 
U.S. 602, 617 (1993) ([“D]ue process requires a ‘neutral and detached judge in the first 
instance.’”) (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1972)).  Of 
significant note is that the neutral decision-maker does not necessarily need to be a judge. See 
Morrison, supra note 31, at 612–13 (citing administrative officials and military tribunals to 
illustrate that “fair process is not confined to judicial process”). 
 62. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 
(1863)). 
 63. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537–38. 
 64. See Morrison, supra note 31, at 1614. 
 65. See id. 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
 67. Id.; see also id. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives . . . and all executive 
and judicial Officers . . . shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution . . . .”). 
 68. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 69. In the analogous context of the political question doctrine, when presented with a 
nonjusticiable political question, “a court acknowledges the possibility that a constitutional 
provision may not be judicially enforceable.  Such a decision is of course very different from 
determining that specific congressional action does not violate the Constitution.” U.S. Dep’t 
of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992); see also Morrison, supra note 7, at 437 
n.145. 
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process element of the Due Process Clause discernibly persists even during 
times of suspension.70  Thus, in order to faithfully discharge its textually 
prescribed duty of independent constitutional fidelity, the Executive must 
self-regulate to ensure it provides fair process during suspension. 
Of course, as a matter of necessity, the Executive will likely under-enforce 
any such rules during national exigency.  Skeptics may thusly question the 
significance of an underlying due process right when its two primary facets—
here, judicial review and remedy—are ousted and there is little motivation 
for vigorous enforcement.  Indeed, “the cash value of a right is often nothing 
more than what the courts (or some other institution with enforcement 
authority, for example, Congress) will do if the right is violated.”71 
However, there are, in fact, potential remedies outside habeas to enforce 
the Due Process Clause’s guarantee of fair process.  Such remedies might 
include a Bivens action for damages72 or prosecution under the Non-
Detention Act.73  While the Supreme Court has been remarkably loathe to 
expand the breadth of Bivens suits,74 there may be some promise for a “fair 
process suit” given that the Court has already permitted Bivens suits to 
provide redress for other violations of the Due Process Clause.75  The Non-
Detention Act may also offer some hope to enforce a violation of fair process.  
The Non-Detention Act provides that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or 
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of 
Congress.”76  Justice Souter asserted that this Act was passed to prevent 
another Korematsu and “intended to preclude reliance on vague 
congressional authority . . . for detention or imprisonment at the discretion of 
the Executive.”77  Such a backdrop certainly seems apt to preserve the right 
to free process during times of national crisis where access to the Great Writ 
is suspended.  Although political obstacles could impede this remedy—it 
would entail the Executive prosecuting its own officials—it is certainly 
feasible that “a new President might take office motivated to punish the 
misdeeds of the old.”78  Although these remedies are not without legal and 
 
 70. See supra notes 39–58 and accompanying discussion. 
 71. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 857, 887 (1999). 
 72. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing an implied cause of action for damages as appropriate 
recourse for a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). 
 74. The Court has been steadfastly unwilling to extend Bivens to new contexts if there are 
any “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” 
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; see, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1859–61 (2017); Minneci 
v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 120 (2012); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 547–548, 562 (2007); 
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473–474 (1994).  Another obstacle is the doctrine of qualified 
immunity, which often shields officials from damages liability.  For further reading, see 
Morrison, supra note 7, at n. 139. 
 75. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979) (allowing a Bivens action to 
remedy equal protection violations of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause). 
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). 
 77. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 543–44 (2004). 
 78. Morrison, supra note 7, at 435–36. 
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practical hurdles, “unlawful detention during a suspension is not necessarily 
consequence-free.”79  The underlying right to fair process retains at least a 
modicum of “cash value” during suspension.80 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the procedural elements of the Due Process Clause do not entirely 
depend upon the Great Writ for their existence.  Even during suspension, 
essential promises of the Due Process Clause live on in the detainee’s right 
to fair process.  The Executive should strive to uphold such constitutional 
norms, even in the absence of judicial review during a national crisis, for 
exigency does not trump constitutional fidelity. 
 
 79. Id. at 436. 
 80. See Levinson, supra note 71, at 887. 
